A New Kind of "Outrageous Misconduct": Efforts to Undermine the Law's Ability to Deter and Punish
Intentional and Outrageous Corporate Behavior

You can't strike [at a corporation's] heart. It has none. The only way you can get the attention of a
corporation and talk to it is through its pocketbook… You can talk to the president of Johns-Manville.
He is not too busy to talk to you, and you can send him a message. But when you do, it is going to
have to be loud enough for him to hear it. And you can say to him that, at least in southern Mississippi,
‘We are not going to condone this kind of action.'
- Scott Baldwin, plaintiff's attorney in Jackson v. Johns-Manville, from his summation, justifying their
request of a million punitive damages award.[1]
I. Introduction
Asbestosis and mesothelioma are irreversible, progressive respiratory diseases which slowly and
painfully suffocate their victims.[2] Both diseases are caused exclusively by the inhalation of asbestos
dust and only become manifest some ten to forty years after the victim's initial exposure.[3] Upon
being diagnosed with mesothelioma, a unique form of cancer, 75% of patients die within one year.[4]
In the early 1980s, it came to light that Johns-Manville, one of the largest asbestos manufacturers, had
been fully aware of the connection between exposure to asbestos dust and the development of serious
respiratory disease for at least fifty years. During that fifty-year period, Johns-Manville not only failed
to warn potential victims of the risks associated with its product, but it also actively concealed that
information in order to safeguard company profits. As one particularly egregious facet of a large-scale
cover-up, the company routinely withheld x-ray results from periodic employee physical exams –
refusing to inform their employees that a serious respiratory disease had been diagnosed.[5] In a 1949
company memorandum, Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, the medical director of Canadian Johns-Manville,
stated that the employees "have not been told of the diagnosis, for it is felt that as long as the man feels
well, is happy at home and at work and his physical condition remains good nothing should be
said."[6] For the unwitting employee, this unconscionable practice subjected him to additional
exposure to the deadly dust, substantially contributing to the seriousness of his illness. For JohnsManville, however, this practice was win-win. Not only did the company benefit from the additional
years of labor by experienced employees, but they also increased the likelihood that they would escape
all liability for their intentional misconduct. Often, employees would not discover their illness until
after retirement, when the statute of limitations had elapsed on their workers compensation and tort
claims.[7] In a further attempt to conceal the dangerous nature of their product, Johns-Manville and
other manufacturers persuaded scientists to delay publication of findings that would be detrimental to
the asbestos industry, or to soften the impact of such reports by obscuring their results.[8]
The asbestos manufacturers also manipulated the legal system in order to conceal the risks of asbestos.
When asbestos victims finally realized that their respiratory diseases were caused by exposure to
asbestos and sued the manufacturers, the companies always settled out of court -- eliminating the
potential of publicly-accessible trial records.[9] Further, as a condition of these out-of-court
settlements, manufacturers demanded strict confidentiality and assurance from plaintiffs' lawyers that

they would forgo all future asbestos suits and withhold from other plaintiffs' lawyers any evidence that
had been obtained.[10] The cases that actually reached trial encountered an additional hurdle in the
form of a highly effective "state of the art" defense, which asserted that asbestos manufacturers could
not be held liable for claims arising from asbestos exposure that occurred before the release of a certain
epidemiological study in 1965,[11] because manufacturers had no prior knowledge of the risks of
asbestos.[12] This defense was later crippled by plaintiffs' lawyers who, working together, were able to
pool evidence which conclusively revealed that Johns-Manville had known about the dangers of
asbestos since the early 1930s.[13]
After this revelation, asbestos manufacturers quickly scrambled back to settling most disputes out-ofcourt, in order to avoid exposure to large compensatory and punitive damages awards – which were
being awarded with greater frequency.[14] In the late spring of 1982, however, Johns-Manville
puzzled plaintiffs' attorneys by allowing a number of cases that would have formerly settled out-ofcourt, to go to trial.[15] It soon became apparent that this was yet another calculated maneuver
designed to minimize Johns-Manville's financial losses when the company filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, automatically staying all pending litigation.[16]
The tort system with its prospect of punitive damages is an indispensable tool for uncovering and
combating outrageous corporate misconduct, like that engaged in by Johns-Manville and other
asbestos manufacturers. In the absence of punitive damages, asbestos manufacturers could not have
been punished for their callous actions and the public would remain at the mercy of companies who
could coldly calculate that they could profit from failing promptly to disclose known risks in the
future. By deterring such "outrageous misconduct," punitive damages awards help ensure that, in the
future, the public is warned of potential dangers and that guilty parties are punished. However, our tort
system, which is the best vehicle for addressing such intentional misconduct, is currently under attack
by the so-called "tort reform" movement. Representatives of business interests are promoting federal
and state legislation to limit tort liability and to restrict damages awards, including awards of punitive
damages, by focusing the public's attention on anecdotes of alleged abuses. These so-called abuses are
unrelated to the field of environmental torts, but they are cleverly designed to dupe citizens into
relinquishing their best protection against outrageous and intentional misconduct by the industries the
tort reformers represent.
Part II of this essay examines the genesis of punitive damages awards and the evolution of their use in
the courts, discussing their usefulness in deterring future intentional misconduct that undermines
public health and safety. Additionally, it responds to the claims of tort reform proponents who seek to
restrict punitive damages awards and whose true aim is to protect industry from legitimate legal
claims.
Part III argues that efforts to restrict punitive damages awards threaten to curtail our most effective
weapon against outrageous corporate misconduct. This section explores how such limits would be
especially detrimental in the field of environmental and public health law where punitive damages,
although rarely sought, have been extremely important to vindicate society's interests.
The concluding section paints a picture of the world we can expect to inhabit if punitive remedies are
reduced or eliminated and it summarizes why this vital tool should not be restricted.

II. Punitive Damages in Our Society and the Threat of "Tort Reform"
Punitive damages are an indispensable tool in the hands of the community, enabling it to hold powerful
entities accountable for their dangerous misconduct. From the very beginning in the 18th Century, the
role of punitive damages in the U.S. legal system has not changed significantly – they are still
employed to punish and deter outrageous misconduct by defendants.[17] However, today, as the scale
of harm companies are capable of inflicting on society has vastly expanded, punitive damages are even
more important than ever before to protect public health and the environment. The current tort reform
movement that seeks to restrict or eliminate the availability of punitive damages is a transparent
attempt to diminish that power.[18]
A. The Early History of Punitive Damages
Punitive, or exemplary, damages are awarded in addition to compensatory or nominal damages and are
designed not to compensate a victim for an injury, but to punish and deter the outrageous misconduct
of defendants.[19] "Outrageous conduct" is characterized by either an evil motive or a reckless
indifference to the rights of others.[20] Punitive damages are never awarded for mistakes, accidents or
mere negligence.[21] The amount of a punitive damages award is determined by the fact finder, either
a judge or jury, who is deciding a case.[22] Unlike civil or criminal penalties, punitive damage awards
paid by defendants traditionally have been received by the plaintiff, not the state or federal
treasury.[23]
In Genay v. Norris, one of the earliest punitive damage awards recorded in the United States, a plaintiff
was awarded £400 in 1784 by the South Carolina Supreme Court in order to punish a defendant for
having adulterated the plaintiff's wine.[24] The Genay court may have decided to award punitive
damages, in part, because the plaintiff suffered excruciating pain and, in part, because the defendant
was a physician who should have known better.[25] Before adoption in America, punitive damages
had been awarded by English courts for approximately twenty years.[26] Many of the earliest cases
involved seductions of a plaintiff's daughter,[27] however, by the 1800s, punitive damages were being
awarded for a wide variety of actions in which a defendant's conduct constituted gross negligence, or
involved malicious intent.[28] Some examples which characterize the awards of that time include: a
train passenger who was awarded exemplary damages after the gross negligence of a train company
allowed a collision between two trains;[29] a farmer who was awarded double damages in his action
against a railroad company for its failure to compensate him for three hogs that were struck and killed
by a company train;[30] and a voter who was awarded punitive damages in his action against a voting
official who, motivated by partisan malice, refused the voter access to the polls.[31]
Punitive damages were rarely awarded and relatively modest in size until the late 1970s, when a
number of companies were forced to pay large sums in widely reported products liability lawsuits.[32]
Perhaps due to the indelible memory of those highly publicized cases, many Americans continue to
believe that products liability torts constitute the bulk of the punitive damages which are awarded.
This, however, is not the case. Most punitive damages are awarded in automobile personal injury and
landowner liability actions, followed by medical malpractice, business, and then product liability
actions.[33]

Although punitive damages and compensatory damages are awarded for different reasons, in practice,
the distinction between the two is somewhat nebulous. For the most part, a compensatory award is
intended to make a victim whole by monetarily indemnifying her for any actual losses.[34] Punitive
damages are awarded, when the defendant has acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit, in order to
deter similar future misconduct and to express the censure of the community.[35] Between the two
types of awards, there may also be a degree of cross-over because, like punitive damages, some types
of compensatory damages cannot be valued in precise dollar amounts. For instance, there is no precise
mechanism that a jury may employ to calculate intangible claims such as pain and suffering as opposed
to other types of compensatory damages, such as lost wages. To compound matters, compensatory
awards for such intangible harms are relatively new and may have been compensated historically
through punitive damage awards prior to the nineteenth century.[36] Despite this potential
commingling of roles, it is nevertheless clear that courts have always viewed punitive damages as tools
of deterrence and retribution.[37] In Day v. Woodworth,[38] which was decided in 1852, the Supreme
Court stated that "exemplary or vindictive" damages had been awarded for tort actions for more than a
century.[39]
Considering the potential for overlap between compensatory and punitive damages, it would not be
surprising if jurors occasionally conflated the roles of each by awarding punitive damages in order to
compensate the victim and by awarding compensatory damages in order to punish the tort feasor. This
might conceivably occur in states where punitive damages have been statutorily capped. In response to
such caps, juries may shift the would-be excess punitive damages award into the compensatory
damages category, attributing the extra damages to intangible harms, rather than lessening the total
award for the victim. However, even if such isolated practices exist, they would not signify a
nationwide misapprehension by juries of their proper roles. When a jury is given full reign to award
compensation and punishment as it deems proper, there is no reason to suspect that it would
characterize a compensatory award as a punitive damage or vice versa. It is only when a jury's ability
to allocate the awards as it sees fit is thwarted by external means (such as tort reform) that monetary
damages may be "misallocated."

B. Punitive Damages Safeguard Public Health and the Environment
Although one aim of punitive damages is retribution, their ability to deter future misconduct may be
their most beneficial function. For this reason, punitive damages are also called "exemplary damages,"
because the punished party will serve as an "example" to deter others. The availability of punitive
damages equips citizens with the means to deter the outrageous misconduct of otherwise untouchable
entities. Historically, the imposition of punitive damages has precipitated the recall of dangerous items,
the enhancement of safety procedures, and the inclusion of warning labels on dangerous products.[40]
Consequently, punitive damages do not merely punish the offender – they also act as sentinels of
public health and safety.
The deterrent function of punitive damages is especially potent in situations where an actor's conduct is
harmful but not deterred through regulatory means. For example, an actor may be undeterred by the
threat of fines where the magnitude of such fines is not great enough to outweigh the benefits of the
misconduct. Additionally, there is no regulatory deterrence at all where an actor's harmful conduct is in

full compliance with applicable regulations. In both cases, punitive damages may be the only way to
deter the undesirable conduct. Despite adequate regulatory deterrence, in the hands of concerned
citizens, the threat of punitive damages will successfully leverage community interests against those of
the actor – thus ensuring public health and safety.
One of the best-known examples of the ability of punitive damages to protect the safety of the public
involved the 1972 Ford Pinto hatchback. In that case, punitive damages were particularly effective
because Ford's decision to conceal knowledge about the safety hazards of its vehicle was not deterred
by ordinary threats of civil or criminal penalties. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,[41] the Court of
Appeal of California awarded punitive damages in the amount of 5 million to the plaintiffs,[42] who
were severely burned when the passenger compartment of their 1972 Ford Pinto hatchback became
engulfed in flames after being rear-ended by a car traveling at 28-37 miles per hour.[43] The driver
died of congestive heart failure resulting from burns and the passenger, a 13 year old boy, survived, but
suffered permanently disfiguring burns on his face and body.[44] Based on crash tests conducted by
Ford, the company was aware that the 1972 Pinto hatchback failed to meet federal standards which
required that a car manufactured that year could withstand a fixed object, rear-impact collision without
significant fuel spillage.[45] For as little as .30 per vehicle, Ford could have made the fuel tank safe in
a 34 to 38-mile-per-hour rear-end collision, thus complying with federal requirements and preventing
the horrible tragedy that befell the Grimshaw plaintiffs.[46] In Grimshaw, the court held that punitive
damages are recoverable "where the defendant's conduct constitutes a conscious disregard of the
probability of injury to others."[47] The court elaborated that a "conscious disregard" is satisfied when
"the plaintiff establishe[s] that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his
conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences."[48] In Grimshaw,
existing regulations were insufficient to deter Ford's decision to release the Pinto hatchback into the
marketplace. Compensatory damages alone, likewise, would have had little deterrent effect on a
company as wealthy as Ford. In such circumstances, deterrence must come from punitive damages.
In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., a case which is representative of a multitude of similar asbestos
lawsuits, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld an award of punitive damages in the amount of
0,000 against an asbestos manufacturer for the company's failure to warn consumers about the danger
of its product.[49] In Fischer, as in many other asbestos cases, Johns-Manville was forced to admit
what it had concealed for years – that it had been aware of the link between asbestos exposure and
pulmonary disease since the 1930s.[50] The Fischer court stated that "[b]ecause product safety is the
paramount concern of products liability law, it is indifference to or disregard of the dangers posed by
the product in its defective state that should be the key factor in justifying an award of punitive
damages..."[51] Like Ford, the asbestos manufacturer in Fischer knew about the dangers posed by its
product and indifferently chose to conceal that knowledge from the public.[52]
Unlike the immediate danger posed by Ford's faulty fuel tanks, the harm created by asbestos remains
largely undetected during a long latency period – manifesting only some ten to forty years postexposure.[53] Logically, this suggests that manufacturers of products which enjoy a long latency
period before their injuries appear will require a stronger deterrent than the Fords of the world for at
least two reasons. First, a long latency frustrates a plaintiff's ability to detect the disease and prove
causation, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the manufacturer will be held responsible for its
misconduct. Second, a long latency creates the potential that the manufacturer may no longer be in
business (and no longer liable for damages) by the time the disease manifests itself. Consequently, a

longer latency period increases the likelihood that a manufacturer will choose to conceal the dangers of
its product from the public. Judge Richard Posner and Professor William Landes have asserted that
where, as here, the risk of discovery is very low and the risk of harm is very high, punitive damages
are an efficient remedy.[54]
An examination of Silkwood v. Kerr-Mcgee Corp.[55] demonstrates how punitive damages have been
particularly useful in redressing an actor's conduct where, though harmful, the conduct was not subject
to any civil or criminal penalties. In Silkwood, the United States Supreme Court held that the punitive
damages awarded in a common law tort suit were not preempted by the fact that the nuclear plant had
adhered to all of the regulations of the Atomic Energy Act.[56] Silkwood's plaintiff, the father of a
deceased woman who suffered radiation injury while working for a nuclear power plant which had
negligently allowed the escape of plutonium, was awarded ten million dollars in punitive damages.[57]
Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had investigated the Silkwood incident and found no
material violation of federal regulations[58] and the state had no authority to regulate the safety
practices of nuclear plants,[59] the Court held that the punitive damages were not preempted.[60] The
Court reasoned that it "[wa]s abundantly clear… that the punitive damages award in [Silkwood] deters
a nuclear facility from operating in the same manner as Kerr-McGee" [61] and that "the prospect of
paying a large fine – in this case a potential $ 10 million – for failure to operate a nuclear facility in a
particular manner has an obvious effect on the safety precautions that nuclear licensees will
follow."[62]
In addition to their ability to deter, punitive damages are also an effective expression of community
outrage where the physically injured "victim" is not a person, but the environment. In In re Exxon
Valdez[63] an Alaskan jury awarded billion in punitive damages against Exxon for its negligent
shipping practices, which encompassed lax policies that enabled fatigued and intoxicated
crewmembers to navigate its vessels.[64] The case arose from a 1989 oil spill, which occurred when
one of Exxon's oil tankers ran aground, resulting in the disgorgement of 10.8 million gallons of crude
oil into Alaska's formerly pristine Prince William Sound.[65] The resulting devastation, which
sheathed 1,200 miles of coastline in oil and suffocated hundreds of thousands of sea birds, otters,
whales, and seals, was widely televised.[66] In addition to the environmental damage, the spill also
caused incalculable financial loss by halting all fishing, which was the economic foundation of the
Sound.[67] Considering the aggregate outrage of the nation, it was not surprising that In re Exxon
Valdez, a consolidated case on behalf of thousands of commercial fishermen, resulted in the largest
punitive damages award of its time.[68] In fact, the spill had such a profound impact on the nation that
it also precipitated the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which mandated, inter alia, that
tanker crews be tested for alcohol and drugs, that tankers be replaced by double-hulls by 2015, and that
Coast Guard units be appropriately stationed and equipped to respond to oil spills.[69] Since that
infamous spill, both the number of oil spills and the volume of oil released into U.S. waters have
decreased considerably.[70] Incredibly, however, some fifteen years after the spill, In re Exxon Valdez
is still unresolved as the newly merged Exxon Mobil, a company which earned 2.4 billion in revenue
during the last fiscal year,[71] continues to appeal the size of the punitive damages award (currently at
billion including interest).[72]
In each of these cases, as well as many others, the availability of punitive damages enabled citizens to
hold otherwise undeterrable defendants accountable for their grossly negligent or outrageous
misconduct. These types of law suits not only vindicate the plaintiff, but they also leave society a safer

place. For instance, the punitive damages awarded in the above cases prompted Ford to recall the 1972
Ford Pinto[73] and forced Kerr-McGee to close its nuclear plant while simultaneously placing other
entities on notice that they could suffer the same fate if they choose to sacrifice safety for profit.[74] In
each of these cases, the companies had knowledge of the danger that their products or practices posed
to the public but chose to take a gamble that the monetary benefits of concealing that knowledge would
outweigh the potential costs. Additionally, either due to their great wealth or compliance with federal
regulations, each of the companies was virtually immune from any type of deterrent, save punitive
damages. In the absence of punitive damages, these companies would have been substantially less
inclined to cease their dangerous practices. Moreover, in the absence of their public example, a greater
number of future offenders would have undoubtedly engaged in the same types of deceptive practices.
C. Punitive Damages under Attack
The ability of citizens to hold entities responsible for their outrageous misconduct by seeking
unfettered punitive damages is currently under attack by the very industries which stand to lose the
most by the continued availability of this remedy. The current, so-called "tort reform movement"
which purportedly questions the effectiveness of punitive damages is not a new phenomenon – it has
historical roots. In the 1850s, two authors of punitive damages treatises, Simon Greenleaf and
Theodore Sedgwick, engaged in a public debate about the utility of punitive damages.[75] Greenleaf
considered punitive damages to be an improper intrusion of the public into private disputes,[76] while
Sedgwick viewed them as an appropriate blending of society's interests and those of the plaintiff.[77]
In today's version of the debate, the "reformers" complain chiefly about "windfalls to plaintiffs" and
"wild and unpredictable outcomes" which should qualify as unconstitutional takings of a defendant's
property.[78] In order to sell their proposal to the American public, these "tort reformers" package their
product as the antidote to an ailing healthcare system – insisting that punitive damages awards against
pharmaceutical companies and doctors will result in restricted access to adequate health care.[79] To
remedy the system, these "reformers" propose, inter alia, that the standard of proof be raised in
punitive damages cases from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence and that
direct proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages be required.[80]
Their efforts have been largely successful. In response to these calls for reform, many states have
voluntarily enacted measures such as placing "caps" on punitive damages.[81] At the federal level,
legislation was recently enacted which will require future class action lawsuits, which often seek
punitive damages, to proceed in federal courts (rather than more sympathetic state venues), unless
more than two-thirds of the plaintiffs are citizens of the state in which the action is filed and the
defendant is headquartered there.[82] Unfortunately for the American public, these legislative reform
measures are attempting to remedy straw man concerns. Already, punitive damages awards are subject
to numerous restrictions and opportunities for review. Therefore, there is absolutely no danger that an
unconstitutional taking will occur.[83] The true aim of these "reformers" is not the reform of an ailing
system as they claim, but the complete elimination of public accountability for the conscienceless
"business decisions" of industry. Tort reform will not enhance our quality of life. To the contrary, it
will destroy our most effective means to preserve and improve our quality of life.
The proponents of tort reform, such as the American Tort Reform Association ("ATRA") are
essentially front groups which are financed by insurance companies and industry representatives.
These "reformers" advance their agenda by focusing the public's attention on caricatures such as the

greedy lawyer or the parasitic plaintiff – never once mentioning corporate interests.[84] One of their
most effective weapons is the political commercial, in which they employ actors to portray "ordinary
citizens" who are upset about the current system.[85] One such commercial, funded by the innocuously
named "Citizens for a Sound Economy," featured two average people discussing how "the system is
out of whack," because "[f]ewer people nowadays are willing to accept responsibility for their own
doin's."[86] It is worth noting that, while the ATRA has been loudly decrying the abuse of the court
system, they, themselves, have been doing most of the abusing. From 1991-1994, ATRA members
filed 37,998 lawsuits in five states.[87]
The tort reformers' argument that the plaintiff is receiving a windfall ignores the state's interest in
encouraging such lawsuits for the benefit of the public good. The availability of punitive damages
encourages plaintiffs, who would otherwise be discouraged by the time, money, and effort required, to
file suits which may benefit the entire community by holding actors responsible for their outrageous
misconduct. In addition to the ordinary stresses experienced by those who file lawsuits, plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages may need additional encouragement to endure more aggravation on top of
having often already suffered significant injury at the hands of the defendant. Similarly, the availability
of these awards also encourages attorneys to take such cases. Because of the inherent difficulty in
establishing the triggering conditions for punitive damages, many public health and safety actions
require intense effort and a substantial initial outlay of funds.[88] The availability of punitive damages
ensures that attorneys who have the means to win, will accept such cases. The result of redirecting
such damages to state repositories,[89] as tort reformers propose, will be the filing of fewer cases and
an increased likelihood that corporate offenders will escape punishment and deterrence. It is clear why
the "reformers" would support such a self-serving proposal.
The unconstitutional takings argument is similarly unpersuasive because the United States Supreme
Court has already circumscribed the scope of the punitive damages awards in order to protect against
that possibility. In a series of opinions assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages, the Court
has restricted their size and scope. In the most recent decision, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company v. Campbell,[90] the Court clarified the three excessiveness guideposts, originally
announced in BMW v. Gore,[91] which define the boundaries of punitive damages awards.[92] The
three Gore guideposts directed reviewing courts to consider (1) "the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct,"[93] (2) the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,[94] and (3) a
comparison of the amount of punitive damages to any "civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct."[95]
With respect to the reprehensibility guidepost, the State Farm Court announced that five factors should
be considered, including whether a defendant's conduct reflects: (1) "indifference to or a reckless
disregard of the health or safety of others;" (2) "intentional malice, trickery, or deceit" vs. "mere
accident;" (3) "repeated actions" vs. "an isolated incident;" (4) whether the harm inflicted was physical
or economic; or (5) whether "the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability."[96]
With respect to Gore's second guidepost, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, the State
Farm Court stated that a ratio of no more than 4:1 would be appropriate in most instances.[97] This
suggestion does not appear to preclude the possibility of a higher award where "a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages;" where "the injury is hard to
detect;" or where "the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to

determine."[98] Additionally, the Court suggested that where compensatory damages were
"substantial," that a 1:1 ratio would be appropriate.[99]
With respect to the third guidepost, which directs courts to compare punitive damages awards to any
civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct, the Court stated that
"[p]unitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a
criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award."[100] In addition to
limiting the scope of punitive damages, the Court has also held that the Due Process Clause requires
that awards of punitive damages be subject to meaningful judicial review in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg.[101] In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,[102] the Court mandated that
this judicial review must be conducted de novo, reasoning that a jury award of punitive damages is not
a factual determination which should be reviewed deferentially.[103]
Considering all of the restrictions on the award of punitive damages, there is little danger that such an
award will be unjust. However, despite these protections and the knowledge of the tort reformers'
obvious vested interests, the American public is still being swayed by glossy sales pitches and
increasingly favors tort reform.
D. Why Recent Tort "Reforms" are Dangerous
The tort "reform" remedies, proposed by industry groups and adopted by various states, have reduced
the ability of citizens to hold entities accountable for and to deter future outrageous misconduct.
Among the different types of reforms, several states have enacted caps on punitive damages that
reduce the amount of the awards and increase their predictability. Additionally, some states have raised
the burden of proof in punitive damages cases, making an already onerous task even more so for the
plaintiff, thereby decreasing the ability of citizens to deter harmful conduct. The end result of these
reforms will likely be an increase in harmful activity that jeopardizes public health and the
environment.
1. Caps on Punitive Damages Result in Under-Deterrence of Harmful Conduct
The state adoption of measures that cap punitive damages awards will prove detrimental to public
health and the environment because would-be violators will no longer be effectively deterred. In order
for penalties to deter wrong-doing, they must be large enough, relative to the wealth of the defendant.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey expressed this idea when it stated that
"the amount of the … penalty must be high enough to insure that polluters cannot simply absorb the
penalty as a cost of doing business. Otherwise, a rational profit maximizing company will choose to
pay the penalty rather than incur compliance costs."[104] In states where punitive damages have been
capped by the legislature, the ability of such damages to deter is reduced.
It follows logically that a reduction in punitive damages will result in a decrease in deterrence of
harmful activity. This idea is echoed by the Second Restatement of Torts which states that "the degree
of punishment or deterrence resulting from a judgment is … in proportion to the means of the guilty
person."[105] For this reason, courts often consider the wealth of the defendant when awarding
punitive damages.[106] Despite the United States Supreme Court's recent assertion in State Farm that
"[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages

award,"[107] the Court has repeatedly recognized the appropriateness of considering a defendant's
wealth when determining the reasonableness of a punitive damage award.[108] State courts, likewise,
have long-understood the importance of considering the wealth of the defendant in effectively
deterring misconduct.[109] In fact, in today's climate of massive corporate mergers, in which the
aggregate wealth of individual entities increases dramatically, the argument for a punishment which
takes the offender's wealth into account is fortified.
Another factor which counsels against the adoption of state caps on punitive damages is the fact that
these caps will make the penalties too predictable. The more predictable the penalty, the easier it is for
an entity to perform a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the benefit of the harmful practice against the
potential detriment. Because punitive damages are relatively unpredictable, they frustrate a would-be
defendant's ability to make "business decisions" that will adversely affect the public or the
environment.
2. Raising the Burden of Proof: Raising the Incidence of Harm
By the year 2001, twenty-one states had adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof
in punitive damages cases either through legislative or judicial means.[110] In fact, Colorado has gone
one step further and mandated that punitive damages must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a
criminal standard of proof.[111] The adoption of these higher standards of proof can only decrease
deterrence of misconduct because it will allow more defendants to escape punishment by increasing
the burden on plaintiffs. This extra burden will be nearly insurmountable in health or environmental
claims which involve long latency periods.[112] An increased standard of proof will also present
tremendous obstacles for the plaintiff who must prove the existence of an evil motive on the part of the
defendant, because it already requires evidence which is inaccessible to the plaintiff in the absence of a
"smoking gun."
Moreover, considering that defendants cannot be forced to pay punitive damages if their conduct is
accidental, or merely negligent, the consequence of raising the burden of proof will mean that the
worst offenders, those with malicious intent, will be much harder to prevail against. Raising the burden
effectively stacks the deck even higher against plaintiffs who are unable to compete with powerful
defendants.
When all of these factors are combined, supposed "tort reforms" increase the chances that corporate
entities will make business decisions that incidentally diminish the health and safety of the community.
Without the ability to deter these entities, members of society will have no choice but to trust that these
corporations will conduct business practices in good conscience. In other words, the community must
trust them not produce dangerous products, not to conceal knowledge of those dangers, and to selfreport when they have harmed the environment. Although some corporations are worthy of this trust,
history has shown us that many others are not, especially when faced with a financial bottom line that
strongly argues against "doing the right thing." Since punitive damages are only awarded in cases in
which there has been outrageous misconduct, and no law-abiding corporation has any intention of
engaging in such conduct – it begs the question: why are these corporations working so hard to restrict
or eliminate our access to punitive damages?

III. Tort Reform Threatens to Eliminate Our Most Effective Weapon Against Outrageous
Misconduct
When proponents of tort "reform" argue that the current tort system is broken, they rely heavily on
unrepresentative anecdotal evidence – neglecting to mention how the proposed reforms will undermine
the ability of citizens to protect themselves from intentional outrageous misconduct. This is especially
troubling since the tort vehicle is the most effective, perhaps the only effective, means of deterring
outrageous misconduct by corporations. Such deterrence is particularly needed in the field of
environmental law where, due to numerous factors, environmental crimes are more difficult to deter
than in other areas of law. Moreover, punitive damages are rarely awarded for environmental injuries,
and when they are, the conduct tends to be highly outrageous. If tort reformers are truly concerned
about protecting public health, they should instead focus their efforts at reforming the Bankruptcy
Code which currently allows corporate offenders to escape liability for their outrageous misconduct.
Bankruptcy reform, unlike tort reform, would protect public health by reinforcing the deterrent power
of punitive damages thereby decreasing the likelihood that corporations will behave recklessly in order
to increase profit margins.

A. Bait and Switch: Proffering Misleading Anecdotal Evidence to Justify Tort Reform
Tort reformers often argue that opportunistic plaintiffs and their avaricious lawyers are receiving
windfalls in punitive damages awards against blameless defendants. Not only are their
characterizations disingenuous, but they also grossly misrepresent the true state of the tort system.
Additionally, tort reform proponents neglect to mention that their proposed reforms will either reduce
or eliminate a plaintiff's ability to seek punitive damages against the worst offenders: defendants who
have intentionally engaged in outrageous misconduct which has caused serious injury to large numbers
of people or the environment.
One of the most famous examples employed by the tort reform movement to illustrate the unjustness of
the tort system is the case of the woman who was awarded .7 million dollars in punitive damages after
spilling hot McDonald's coffee on her lap.[113] Many people swallowed this anecdote hook, line, and
sinker and quickly saw it as representative of the rampant abuse of the legal system. What most people
did not realize, was that Mrs. Stella Liebeck, an 81 year-old woman who had never filed a lawsuit in
her life, only sued McDonald's because they refused to compensate her for the pain and medical bills
associated with her severe burns.[114] Most people also were unaware that it was McDonald's policy
to keep their coffee at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit and that they had received over 700 reports of
coffee burns and had settled claims arising from such burns for over 0,000 in the past.[115] However,
even despite these omissions, this example fails to accurately reflect the context in which punitive
damages are usually awarded, and it neglects to mention that the tort reform remedy will eliminate the
ability of citizens to sue for outrageous misconduct.
Outrageous misconduct is deliberate and calculated and usually results in a great deal of damage.
While allowing the temperature on a pot of coffee to get too high may not be nearly as outrageous as a
manufacturer's concealment of the deadliness of its widely distributed asbestos product, the tort reform
movement does not differentiate between the two types of misconduct. Instead, it seeks to eliminate or

restrict all punitive damages – characterizing the whole system as flawed. It is no coincidence that the
tort reformers themselves stand to gain the most from such reforms. If they succeed in restricting a
citizen's right to sue for punitive damages, outrageous corporate misconduct will undoubtedly increase
in frequency.
B. Tort Reform: Eliminating Our Best Defense Against Outrageous Misconduct
Eliminating or reducing the availability of punitive damages will undermine our most effective
deterrent against outrageous corporate misconduct. In his book, Outrageous Misconduct, Paul Brodeur
emphasizes the importance of tort remedies, especially punitive damages, in the context of asbestos
litigation.[116] In reviewing "Outrageous Misconduct" Harvard law professor David Rosenberg stated
that Brodeur
…proves one point beyond dispute: the tort system was and remains the only institution capable of
bringing justice to diseased workers. Were it not for the tort system, the evidence of the manufacturers'
policy of silence probably would never have been disclosed, the victims of that policy would never
have received anything approaching just compensation, the industry would never have been held
accountable for its actions, and there would never have been any serious warning to other industries
that might be tempted to ignore the human costs of their enterprise.[117]
Without the strong financial incentives that only the tort system provides, evidence of the massive
cover-up engaged in by the asbestos industry might never have been revealed. The tort system, which
carries the prospect of punitive damages, not only created an incentive for lawyers to uncover
damaging information, but it also provided asbestos plaintiffs with the financial means to do so. From
the beginning, the playing field was grossly uneven – asbestos manufacturers had far more capital to
spend on litigation expenses than their worker victims and held all of the self incriminating evidence
safely in their own hands. There was a dearth of incriminating evidence because the asbestos
manufacturers had for years been settling claims out-of-court, insisting on confidentiality, and
precluding the release of any evidence related to those claims.[118] As a result, there were no public
records to prove that the industry knew about the dangers of asbestos prior to each current case, and no
former plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney who were permitted to share evidence. In essence, each plaintiff's
attorney was forced to recreate the wheel. Furthermore, the plaintiffs that dared to take the
manufacturers to court found themselves engaged in a "war of attrition" in which the asbestos industry
exploited its superior financial position in an attempt to outspend the often impoverished
plaintiffs.[119] These tactics created nearly insurmountable obstacles for plaintiffs' attorneys, many of
whom had to go into personal debt in order to finance the lawsuits.[120] Only the tort system offered
the prospect of reimbursement for their time and expenses and a potential return on their investment. In
the absence of that prospect, evidence of the cover-up would likely have never been discovered.
The tort system was also the only vehicle which could provide just compensation for the asbestos
victims, in part, because it involved individual evaluations of their claims. Alternative dispute
resolution, which usually involves a cookie-cutter benefits scheme, will always over-compensate some
victims and under-compensate others because it lacks the ability to account for variations in
circumstances. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 ("FAIRA"),[121] a recent
proposal which would establish a national administrative trust fund to compensate asbestos victims, is
a good example of how proposed alternatives fail to compensate asbestos victims as well as the tort

system. The proposed trust would be funded by insurers and defendant asbestos companies in the
amount of 3 billion in exchange for the elimination of all future liability.[122] Unlike the tort system
which involves a highly-individualized appraisal of plaintiffs' claims, the trust fund would disburse
compensation in a fixed range on a no-fault basis according to particular categories of illness.[123]
Critics of the plan argue that these fixed compensation ranges fail to adequately compensate victims as
well as the tort system would.[124] For example, the plan may pay as little as ,000 to compensate some
victims of lung cancer[125] – an amount which is far less than the ,000-,000 that a similarly situated
plaintiff would receive in the tort system.[126] Moreover, even the highest award that a victim may
receive ( million for mesothelioma), may be insufficient to cover medical costs, considering that the
annual treatment expenses for mesothelioma often exceed 0,000.[127] FAIRA would also fail to
adequately compensate the asbestos victims for additional expenses associated with loss of
employment and pain and suffering. Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts criticized FAIRA's inability to
adequately compensate victims and its inappropriate focus on the litigation pressures felt by the
asbestos industry by stating that
[t]he litigation did not create these costs. Exposure to asbestos created them. They are the costs of
medical care, the lost wages of incapacitated workers, the cost of providing for the families of workers
who died years before their time. Those costs are real. No legislative proposal can make them
disappear.[128]
For these reasons, proposals such as FAIRA which cap awards and employ cookie-cutter criteria are
inferior to the tort system at adequately compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Moreover, such an
Act would send the message to other industries that the more people they harm, the more likely they
will escape full liability for their actions by virtue of a government bail out.
The tort system is also uniquely able to force the asbestos manufacturers to bear the full societal
burden of the costs of their unconscionable business decisions. Punitive damages are the community's
way of showing corporations that they may not harm them with impunity. They not only have the
power to force a corporation to pay a fine that will actually hurt, by taking the wealth of the offender
into account, but they also provide an outlet for the community to express its anger. Only the tort
system is able to subject corporate entities to the simultaneous financial sting and condemnation of the
community.
Finally, the exemplary damages awarded against the asbestos industry effectively warned other
industries against engaging in the same outrageous misconduct. Because the threat of punishment was
so severe and public, the asbestos litigation and ensuing bankruptcies could not fail to send a strong
message to other industries: engage in outrageous misconduct at your peril.
Although published in 1985, Outrageous Misconduct's exploration of the development of asbestos
litigation and the threat that tort reform poses to public safety still has a lot of currency two decades
later. The tort reform movement that threatened to weaken the power of punitive damages in the mid80s still looms large today. In fact, tort reform has gained a lot of momentum today, given the strong
political ties between the White House, Congress and industry. Brodeur's analysis of the role of
punitive damages in deterring the outrageous misconduct of the asbestos industry is equally applicable
to corporate misconduct in other areas.

C. Greater Need to Deter Outrageous Misconduct in the Environmental Arena
The inherent characteristics of most environmental pollutants are obstacles to the effective deterrence
of outrageous misconduct in the field of environmental law. Punitive damages, therefore, are crucial in
the environmental arena in order to counteract those built-in obstacles. Moreover, outrageous
misconduct in the field of environmental law often involves large-scale threats to public health and the
environment. If the tort reform movement succeeds in diminishing or eliminating punitive damages,
Americans will have relinquished their greatest weapon against outrageous misconduct and public
health and the environment will surely suffer as a result.
In environmental law, attempts to deter would-be violators are accomplished largely through the
penalty provisions in federal environmental statutes. While most environmental regulations include
such deterrents as citizen suit provisions, as well as civil and criminal penalties, they may be less
effective at deterring corporate misconduct than tort actions which carry the prospect of much larger,
incalculable punitive damages. Furthermore, unlike punitive damages, statutory penalties lack the
ability to articulate the moral condemnation of the community, whose environment has been injured by
the outrageous misconduct of a corporate entity. As a result, rather than being deterred by the prospect
of incalculable punitive damages, corporations are able to insert a known variable, an express civil or
criminal penalty, into a matrix which weighs the benefit of polluting against its potential cost. In this
zero-sum game, the environment is often the loser.
1. Punitive Deterrents for Environmental Harm
In environmental law, most deterrence is currently achieved by the civil and criminal penalties
provided by federal regulatory statutes and the availability of provisions which allow citizens to sue
those who violate the regulations. To a lesser extent, deterrence is also achieved by the prospect of
private common law tort or state statutory actions which allow a plaintiff to seek punitive damages.
However, some state tort actions are precluded by a showing that the injurer has complied with an
applicable federal statute, when that statute expressly preempts such state law claims. Tort actions also
act as gap-fillers where no regulation has been promulgated to address the particular harm alleged.
i. Punitive Statutory Remedies
In order to deter violations of federal environmental regulations, many statutes contain penalty
provisions which allow citizens to sue and also provide for civil and criminal fines to be levied as
punishment for violations. Citizen suits assist the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in
deterring violations by decreasing the possibility that a violator will escape punishment, while the civil
and criminal penalties deter violations by reducing the potential monetary benefit of the polluting
activity.
Environmental statutes are better able to deter illegal pollution by allowing citizens to sue violators and
seek civil penalties. In order to encourage these citizen suits, the statutes provide for the
reimbursement of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorneys' fees.[129] This is especially
necessary since these citizen suits do not allow the plaintiff to recover damages, only injunctive action
or civil penalties which are received by the U.S. Treasury.[130]

Many statutory civil penalties can be considerable, having the ability to reach ,000 per day, per
violation.[131] For instance, the Comprehensive Environmental Resource Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA")[132] contains a citizen suit provision which allows "any person [to] commence a
civil suit on his own behalf" against "any person ...who is alleged to be in violation of any standard,
regulation, condition, requirement or order that has become effective pursuant to this chapter..."[133]
As a remedy, the district court may impose a civil penalty[134] of up to ,000 per day for violations of
various CERCLA provisions.[135] Other statutes allow citizens to seek injunctive action, rather than
civil penalties for violations.[136]
The ability of the citizen to sue the polluter is becoming increasingly vital, especially in light of past
budget cuts to the EPA and a recent proposal by the industry-friendly Bush administration to reduce
the 2006 fiscal budget for the EPA by an additional six percent.[137] These budget reductions will
significantly restrict the EPA's ability to enforce environmental regulations, thereby reducing the
potential that a polluter will be caught. The citizen suit provisions allow environmental organizations
to supplement the depleted enforcement capacity of the EPA by serving as "private attorneys
general"[138] to ensure that polluters are discovered and punished. One indication that citizen suits
will increase in deterrent ability was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that strengthened
citizen standing in citizen suits which seek civil penalties.[139] As a result of the decision in Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., a corporation may no longer moot an action by
complying with the environmental regulations only after being caught.[140]
In addition to civil penalties, many of the environmental statutes also provide for criminal penalties
and, in the case of CERCLA, for punitive damages. For instance, RCRA provides criminal penalties
which range from a maximum ,000 per day of violation and/or imprisonment not to exceed two years
for knowingly violating the regulations to up to 0,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than fifteen
years for knowingly endangering others.[141] Similarly, the CAA provides for a number of criminal
penalties, with fines levied pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code and potential maximum
prison sentences ranging from one year for violations such as knowingly failing to pay a fee or the
negligent release of a hazardous air pollutant which places others in imminent danger to fifteen years
imprisonment for the knowing release of a hazardous air pollutant which places others in imminent
danger of serious injury or death.[142] Criminal penalties under the CWA range from maximums of
,000 per day and not more than one year of imprisonment for negligent violations to 0,000 and
imprisonment up to fifteen years for knowing endangerment.[143] Each of these statutes also provide
for the doubling of both the monetary penalty and the imprisonment for a second conviction for the
same violation.[144] Additionally, each statute increases the maximum criminal penalty to million if
the entity which knowingly endangers others is an organization.[145] In addition to civil and criminal
penalties, CERCLA is unique in that it also enables the U.S. government to collect punitive damages
for up to three times the costs incurred as a result of an entity's failure to provide removal or
remediation of the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance.[146] Unlike other penalties,
these punitive damages are deposited into the CERCLA Fund rather than the U.S. Treasury.[147]
The statutory civil and criminal penalties together with the citizen suit provisions are designed to deter
violations of environmental laws by reducing the potential benefit for the would-be polluter to violate
the laws. In other words, if it costs a company ,000 to dispose of waste in a safe manner, but carries a
potential penalty of ,000 for each day that the violation continues, it is rationale that the permit holder
may choose to spend the ,000 to dispose of the waste properly. However, if the risk of discovery is

small, whether due to diminished enforcement capacity at the EPA or the undetectable nature of the
pollution, the potential threat of a fine is reduced and may eventually be eclipsed by the definite
prospect of the ,000 savings to be gained by improper disposal. In such instances, in order to deter the
would-be polluter, either the potential punishment or the threat of discovery must increase
substantially. Citizen suits and stiffer criminal penalties help to achieve this deterrent purpose,
however, they are inferior to the ability of punitive damages to truly deter.
ii. Availability of Punitive Damages in Environmental Law: Tort and Statutory Vehicles
Unlike the citizen suit provisions under the federal environmental statutes, an individual who sues a
polluter for damages pursuant to state law may be awarded compensatory and punitive damages. In
some instances, the courts have held that such state law inspired actions are preempted by federal
statutes designed to regulate the behavior complained of when the behavior is in compliance with the
regulations.[148] However, the courts are hesitant to find preemption unless the relevant statute
expressly calls for it, and even then, they read that preemption narrowly.[149] Tort and state statutory
actions are able to proceed without significant challenge where there exists no applicable federal
statute to regulate the act which caused the injury. Such actions are useful deterrents because they carry
the threat of unpredictable and potentially quite large punitive damages. Additionally, they have the
added ability to express the condemnation of the community.
a. Preemption of State Actions by Federal Law
Although relatively rare, sometimes federal environmental statutes may expressly preempt claims
based on state law (which are often stricter than the federal regulations). When this happens, an
individual may be unable to seek compensation or punitive damages after having sustained an injury
due to defendant's actions as long as that defendant has complied with the applicable federal
regulations. Although the federal statutes may expressly preempt state actions, this ability was
circumscribed by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., in which the United States Supreme Court stated
that express preemption clauses must be read narrowly and "construed in light of a presumption against
pre-emption of state powers."[150] Despite this direction to read preemption clauses narrowly, courts
continue to hold state tort claims (and hence, private punitive damages) to be preempted by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). For example, in Papas v. Upjohn Co.,[151]
the United States Supreme Court held that state law actions for damages which relied upon a showing
that a manufacturer failed to meet a labeling or packaging standard were expressly preempted by
Section 136v of FIFRA[152] which states that "[s]uch State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this
Act."[153] In Papas, the plaintiff, a consumer who was injured by defendant's pesticide products, was
unable to recover damages in actions of negligence, strict liability, and breach of an implied warrant of
merchantability, because each of the claims was predicated on an allegation of inadequate
labeling.[154] This lawsuit was preempted because, although the defendant's label failed to adequately
warn the plaintiff of potential harm, it was nonetheless in compliance with FIFRA's labeling
requirements, thus immunizing the defendant from suits arising from any such labeling failure pursuant
to state law. Similarly, in Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,[155] the United States Supreme Court held that
state common law nuisance actions based on the law of the victim's state and alleging transboundary
pollution were preempted by a point-source's compliance with the CWA regulations. The Court

suggested, however, that if the Vermont property owners wished to sue the paper mill in nuisance, they
could do so pursuant to the common law of the source state, New York.[156]
There are other areas, however, in which state law actions have not been preempted by federal
environmental law. For instance, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, the United States Supreme Court held
that a state common law tort action seeking compensatory and punitive damages was not preempted by
the defendant nuclear plant's compliance with the regulations of the Atomic Energy Act.[157]
Similarly, although they characterized their decision as a close call, in In Re Exxon Valdez,[158] the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the punitive damages sought by private
parties were not preempted by the Clean Water Act.[159] In Exxon Valdez, the court held that the
savings clause, Section 1365 of the Clean Water Act, which states that "[n]othing in this section shall
restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief . . . ." preserves the
common law right to sue for damages.[160] The court's decision legitimized a private damages action
which, at the time, produced the largest (as yet unpaid) punitive damages award in American
history.[161] Unfortunately, the decision has not forced a resolution of the punitive damages tug-ofwar that has been raging in that case for over a decade.[162]
As just mentioned, in order to prevent preemption of state remedies, many statutes include savings
clauses that expressly preserve the individual's right to sue. For example, the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act[163] provides that "[a]ny person who is injured in his person or property through
the violation by any operator of any rule, regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to this Act may
bring an action for damages (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) …."[164]
Similarly, the Toxic Substances and Control Act ("TSCA")[165] expressly protects the right to sue by
providing that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of this Act or any rule or order under
this Act or to seek any other relief."[166] These types of savings clauses, present in most
environmental statutes, clearly demonstrate Congress' intent to preserve an individual's right to sue for
personal damages.
b. State Actions as Gap Fillers
Some tort and statutory claims based on state law are able to proceed where the applicable federal
statute fails to either specifically regulate or expressly preempt the activity which resulted in harm to
the plaintiff. The former instance is far less common today than the latter, because most practices
which may impact the environment have already been regulated, at least to some extent. However, this
was not always the case. For instance, at the turn of the twentieth century, farmers were able to
successfully force copper smelters to reduce their dangerous emissions through private nuisance
suits.[167] At that time, copper smelting, a process which extracted valuable copper from large
amounts of ore, was a booming industry.[168] In Tennessee, farmers had begun to sue the Tennessee
Copper Company because their crops were being destroyed by the large quantities of sulfur dioxide
and arsenic which were deposited on their property as a byproduct of the smelting process.[169] The
farmers' lawsuits acted as gap-fillers because there were no federal air pollution regulations at that
point.[170] As a result of the pressure from those private nuisance suits, Tennessee Copper Company
developed new technology which reduced the output of harmful emissions by harnessing the released
sulfur dioxide and converting it into sulfuric acid.[171] As luck would have it, sulfuric acid became a

valuable commodity in and of itself, because it could be sold to fertilizer manufacturers.[172] Later,
plaintiffs across the country were able to highlight this beneficial aspect of the improved technology
while arguing for the adoption of stricter emissions standards in order to protect their property.[173]
The second, more common instance in which state law acts as a gap-filler to federal regulations occurs
when a statute does not expressly preempt state law regarding an activity which resulted in harm to a
plaintiff. This idea was expressed in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that "Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted."[174] For example, in Coastline Terminals of Conn.,
Inc. v. USX Corp.,[175] the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a
plaintiff's state law claims which were related to petroleum releases were not preempted because the
applicable statute, CERCLA, specifically excluded petroleum contamination from coverage
damages.[176] The state law claim supplements CERCLA by providing a remedy for the plaintiff
where there is no remedy under CERCLA. These types of state law actions provide supplemental
protection for the environment in areas where Congress or federal agencies have yet to set standards
and may be particularly useful deterrents because they create the potential that a polluter will be
subject to punitive damages for his actions.
2. More Punishment is Required to Deter Environmental Harm
If the benefits of a polluting activity outweigh the potential punishment, the activity will not be
sufficiently deterred. Because environmental injuries are often difficult to detect and successfully
prove, many offenders will escape punishment. When combined with the fact that, even when the
offender is caught, he is often only forced to pay a predictable, relatively modest fine, it is not
surprising that environmental crimes are more difficult to deter than other types of offenses. Because
of this greater need for deterrence in environmental law, it is crucial that punitive damages, perhaps the
most effective deterrent of all, remain unfettered in this arena.
i. Deterrence is Hampered by an Inability to Detect and Successfully Sue Environmental
Offenders
The inherent characteristics of most pollutants and the injuries they produce, which make them
difficult to detect and indisputably trace to a source, frustrate attempts to deter polluting
activities.[177] First, pollutants have the ability to commingle indistinguishably with surrounding
pollution. Second, harms arising from pollutants or chemicals may take years to develop. Third, when
the harm finally appears, there may be several potential underlying causes. Finally, due to a lack of
obvious plaintiffs and adequate funding for the EPA, violations are often un-enforced. All combined,
these factors reduce the likelihood that an offender (a) will be discovered, and (b) if discovered, that a
successful tort action will result in an award of punitive damages. In other words, because there is a
decreased risk that a polluter will be caught and successfully sued, there is a greater need for
deterrence in order to protect the environment.
a. Commingling Ability
The fact that a pollutant can commingle indistinguishably with surrounding pollutants may frustrate a
plaintiff's attempt to prove causation in a common law tort suit in two respects. First, the relative blame

cannot be apportioned by a preponderance of the evidence – the traditional civil standard of proof. For
instance, if several factories are releasing pollutants into a river, it would be impossible for a plaintiff
to prove each defendant's relative responsibility. However, depending on the jurisdiction, some
common law has evolved to allow plaintiffs to more easily prove causation through alternative liability
schemes.[178] For instance, in the hypothetical posed, a court may employ the Michie v. Great Lakes
Steel Div.[179] approach and shift the burden of proof to the defendant factories requiring them to
disprove their relative responsibility for the river pollution.[180] Second, the ability of pollutants to
commingle with ease complicates the plaintiff's ability to prove which of many pollutants is actually
responsible for the harm produced. This was part of the problem in Missouri v. Illinois,[181] in which
the United States Supreme Court rejected Missouri's attempt to enjoin Illinois from releasing sewage
into the Illinois river, in part, because Missouri was unable to prove that the increase in typhoid fever
in St. Louis was caused by Illinois' sewage and not Missouri's own.[182] The ability of pollutants to
commingle readily with other substances complicates the ability of a plaintiff to successfully prove
causation.
b. Long Latency Period
Another quality associated with environmental injuries which makes them difficult to detect or prove is
a potentially long latency period. Although some types of environmental damage are immediately
apparent, such as a massive oil spill, other types may go unnoticed for years. For instance, asbestosis
has a latency period of up to forty years between initial exposure to asbestos and development of
respiratory disease.[183] Similarly, a contaminant that has been dumped at a remote site may not be
discovered until long after it has seeped into the ground and contaminated the groundwater. Because of
this long latency period, it will often be far more difficult for plaintiffs to reconstruct the chain of
events leading up to the harm which occurred over a span of decades as opposed to a recent
event.[184] Additionally, a long latency period casts doubt on whether the substance accused of
causing the harm is in fact responsible. The longer time that passes between exposure and discovery of
illness, the more opportunities a person has had to come in contact with other, potentially harmful
substances – especially when the disease in question could have many possible causes.[185] Another
factor which comes into play with a long latency period is the potential that the responsible party may
have long departed the scene – never to be discovered and held responsible. Overall, the longer latency
periods, which are characteristic of environmental injuries, effectively increase the burden on the
plaintiff to prove causation and the likelihood that the offender will escape punishment.
c. Numerous Potential Causes of Disease
In addition to the commingling problem and the long latency problem, the fact that many diseases
could be caused by a number of different factors also deters a plaintiff's ability to prove direct
causation between a substance and an illness. As an example of this difficulty, the Court in Missouri v.
Illinois rejected arguments by the plaintiff State that an increase in the occurrence of typhoid fever in
St. Louis was correlated with an increased release of sewage by Chicago into the Illinois river.[186]
The Court was unconvinced by pure statistical increases in typhoid because there could have been
many other causes for those increases, including pollution from within the state.[187] In Reserve
Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,[188] the plaintiffs were similarly unable to prove a
connection between the defendant's release of taconite tailings[189] into Lake Superior and
gastrointestinal cancer in asbestos workers.[190] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit determined that the tailings did not pose an imminent health threat despite having viewed a
variety of evidence which purported to demonstrate the opposite, including tissue studies of cadavers,
animal experiments, and epidemiological studies.[191] Diseases such as cancer are particularly
resistant to a clean causation analysis because they can be caused by multitudinous factors.[192] The
fact that some diseases may have numerous causes, increases the difficulty for a plaintiff to prove
causation by a particular agent.

d. Under-enforcement
The under-enforcement of environmental laws is another reason why would-be polluters are underdeterred. This occurs both because of a lack of obvious plaintiffs and an inability for the EPA to keep
up with the large number of violations, especially in the wake of successive budget cuts. Unlike most
other areas of law, offenses against the environment do not always implicate an obvious plaintiff. For
instance, consider the company that dumps waste at a remote site and allows it to seep into the ground
where it may never be discovered. Next, compare that conduct to a case where a motorist is rear-ended
in her vehicle by another driver. In the second case, there is clearly a plaintiff – the injured motorist. In
the first case, who is the injured party? While it is true that the "earth" has been injured, the earth is not
a viable plaintiff. The owner of the remote site is the legal victim. Unfortunately, that entity is likely to
be the offender, itself. This type of situation creates the potential that injuries will fail to be remedied.
In order to alleviate this sort of problem, most environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions
which provide for reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.[193] Although the provision of attorneys'
fees mitigates the impact of one of the chief obstacles to filing an action, it will likely only encourage
environmental organizations to sue, rather than the average citizen. However, this can only attempt to
increase the number of law suits, it cannot hasten the discovery of injuries. Another factor which
hampers enforcement of federal regulations is the lack of staff at the EPA. Under-enforcement of
environmental injuries increases the likelihood that offenders will pollute because there is less of a
chance that they will be caught.
e. Over-reliance on Fines Rather than Punitive Damages Awards
Another reason why environmental law is currently unable to deter many violations is its over-reliance
on civil and criminal penalties rather than tort-derived punitive damages. Punitive damages are
superior to penalties in a number of ways. First, punitive damages are not only unpredictable, but they
can be much larger than statutory penalties. Second, punitive damages are able to communicate the
disapproval of the community. Third, the threat of punitive damages can be wielded as leverage by
environmental groups in an attempt to force companies to institute safety improvements.
From a would-be polluter's perspective, one of the biggest advantages of facing a statutory penalty
scheme, as opposed to punitive damages, is the relative predictability of the potential fine. Although
statutory penalties are somewhat flexible, they will always fall within a discrete range. Punitive
damages, on the other hand, tend to be more unpredictable, despite the boundaries applied by the
United States Supreme Court.[194] Thus, it is far more difficult for a corporation to weigh the costs
and benefits of a polluting activity if the potential cost is a completely unknown factor. Especially

when that unknown factor could potentially be much larger than any civil or criminal penalty.
Although civil and criminal penalties can amount to millions of dollars,[195] punitive damages can
amount to billions.[196] As a consequence, the threat of punitive damages is obviously a more potent
deterrent than the possibility of civil or criminal penalties.
Moreover, unlike civil or criminal penalties, punitive damages allow the community to express its
disapproval of a defendant's outrageous misconduct. For this reason, they are superior to penalties
alone, which consist of predetermined ranges formulated by legislators or regulatory agencies.
The availability of punitive damages can also provide useful leverage for environmental groups in
negotiations aimed at pressuring companies to cease polluting. For instance, Earth Island Institute Inc.
was able to convince Southern California Edison ("SCE") to enter into a consent decree, in which SCE
agreed to establish an environmental trust fund and pay attorneys' fees and costs in exchange for Earth
Institute's foregoing their nuisance and Clean Water Act suits,[197] which carried the potential of
punitive damages arising from defendant's operation of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station.[198] The settlement provided that SCE would acquire and restore specific wetlands property
(spending .5 million).[199] In the absence of the potential to sue for punitive damages, it is unlikely
that such a settlement would have occurred. The availability of punitive damages may have compelled
SCE to take the environmental group seriously and bought them a seat at the negotiating table. If only
penalties had been available, it is not likely that SCE would have been willing to agree to as generous a
settlement.
Additionally, unlike civil or criminal penalties, the availability of punitive damages provides an
additional incentive for plaintiffs and attorneys to sue defendants for outrageous misconduct. Because
of the high initial outlays of money and effort which environmental cases often demand, plaintiffs will
often require additional encouragement to file suits. It has been suggested that the availability of
punitive damages allows individual plaintiffs to "serve a qui tam-like function [by encouraging them to
bring] claims which might benefit society."[200] When punitive damages are available, there is an
increase in the chance that a polluter will be sued for its conduct and greater potential that the
punishment will deter both specifically and generally.
Big sticks are needed in order to combat and deter environmental crimes. Although rarely sought,
when punitive damages are awarded in the environmental context, they are richly deserved. Our
current environmental law framework of overlapping federal and state regulations as well as common
law remedies may allow some offenders to escape all liability for knowingly harming the environment.
Deterrence is especially necessary in the environmental context because, due to the nature of most
environmental injuries, offenders often either escape detection or prevail in court because of what may
be characterized as an insurmountable burden on the plaintiff to prove causation. Today, some
companies are choosing to pollute because they consider the penalties, which are predictable and
relatively modest, to be a cost of doing business.[201] If tort reform is successful, it will undermine a
citizen's ability to deter outrageous corporate misconduct and will erode our protections for public
health and the environment. If anything, tort remedies should be strengthened, not weakened.
D. Bankruptcy Reform, not Tort Reform

At a time when Republican politicians are actively restricting the rights of ordinary Americans to
legitimately seek shelter in the bankruptcy system,[202] it is nothing short of hypocritical for them to
allow corporations to continue to abuse the protections of that system. If proponents for tort "reform"
are sincere in their aim to safeguard the health of Americans, their goals would be better served by
shifting their focus from reform of the tort system to reform of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, a
"reform" of the tort system would actually hinder any goal to improve public health because it would
reduce or eliminate an effective means of deterring harmful and outrageous corporate misconduct – the
threat of punitive damages. Conversely, a reform of the Bankruptcy Code would strengthen public
health by eliminating the ability of corporate entities to escape liability for their deliberate, outrageous
conduct through Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, thus amplifying the deterrent potential of
punitive damages.
Proponents of tort "reform" disingenuously suggest that many health catastrophes can be averted by
infringing a plaintiff's ability to seek redress for their injuries. For instance, tort reformers assert that if
pharmaceutical companies are not shielded from consumer lawsuits based on harm resulting from an
FDA-approved drug, the development of life-saving drugs will be adversely affected. Similarly, tort
reformers suggest that access to adequate healthcare will be diminished if punitive damages in medical
malpractice cases are not capped because doctors will be unable to afford the increasing insurance
premiums.[203] Both appeals are insincere. Shielding drug companies who have knowingly allowed a
dangerous product to reach the marketplace, simply because the drug was approved by the FDA, will
not make consumers safer – it will subject them to more danger.[204] Currently, consumers are
protected by two means: regulatory approval by the FDA and the tort system. If tort actions are
eliminated, then only the regulatory protections will remain. Although this protection might have
sufficed at one point in history, today, the FDA is no longer able to safeguard citizen safety due to
budget reductions, decreases in their enforcement staff, and stronger political ties between the current
administration and the pharmaceutical industry which compels the FDA to "fast-track" certain
drugs.[205] Likewise, the suggestion that a reduction in punitive damages awards would stem rising
insurance premiums for doctors and ensure continued access to adequate healthcare, is also insincere.
According to data from Weiss Ratings, Inc., in many states which have voluntarily adopted caps on
punitive damages in medical malpractice cases, contrary to expectations, the insurance premiums have
actually increased.[206] In fact, by infringing the ability of a patient to sue for outrageous misconduct
by a doctor, tort reform makes patients less safe because it not only reduces a patient's ability to be
adequately compensated for harm, but it also diminishes or eliminates the only effective financial
deterrent against reckless, intentional conduct – the award of punitive damages. A far more effective
prophylactic for public health would be a reform of the Bankruptcy Code. Such reform would protect
public health by ensuring that entities bear full responsibility for their actions, thus deterring
outrageous misconduct that endangers public health.
Currently, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy operates as a loophole through which corporate entities can evade
the sting of compensatory and punitive damages which were awarded as punishment for their
outrageous misconduct. Upon filing for bankruptcy, the petitioner is protected by an automatic stay
provision, which provides temporary insulation against creditor demands, including those by tort claim
holders, for the duration of the bankruptcy proceedings.[207] Additionally, after the bankruptcy has
been adjudicated, the debts of the corporation may be fully discharged, including all claims which
arose prior to the filing of bankruptcy.[208] In other words, any claim that arose from the actor's prebankruptcy conduct, including claims that have already been adjudicated as well as future claims

which involve a latency period in discovering the harm, will not be have to be paid by debtor. Once
again, the asbestos cases provide an excellent example of how corporations are able to manipulate the
legal system, in this case the Bankruptcy Code, in order to avoid responsibility for their misdeeds. In
1982, Johns-Manville, an asbestos manufacturer with assets totaling over billion, became the
wealthiest corporation to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.[209] After announcing its impending
bankruptcy proceedings, Johns-Manville characterized itself as a victim of a tort system which allowed
thousands of unmeritorious suits to be sought against it – although punitive damages, which had been
awarded for their reckless and outrageous misconduct, argued the contrary.[210] The company
suggested that Congress enact a "statutory compensation program for asbestos injuries."[211]
This was a clever move on the part of Johns-Manville, because unlike Chapter 7 which would have
required a full liquidation of all of the company's assets, Chapter 11 allowed the company to retain its
assets as long as the bankruptcy court approved its company reorganization plan, which had to make
sufficient provisions for all of its creditors, including both current and future tort claimants.[212] In
order for such a wealthy company to qualify for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it had to demonstrate that the
aggregation of all current and future claims against it were sufficiently large enough to threaten the
company's well-being, but not so large as to necessitate a Chapter 7 liquidation.[213] This was a
delicate balancing act that Johns-Manville was able to accomplish by persuading its epidemiology
experts to "adjust" their estimates of future incidences of asbestos disease.[214] Additionally, in order
to meet but not exceed this critical threshold, the company employed a low figure of ,600 as the
hypothetical disposition cost for each current and future case, with a total dispensation of all claims
projected to be .9 billion.[215] This figure failed to account for the very real prospect of punitive
damages awards.
After nearly three years, during which time no asbestos claimants were able to recover damages from
Johns-Manville, a corporate reorganization plan was finally agreed upon.[216] Through the corporate
reorganization, the company was able to insulate its operating arm from asbestos claims and create a
limited fund that would compensate claimants.[217] Despite the fact that over million dollars in
punitive damages had been awarded by juries in the prior two years, Johns-Manville was able to
successfully set aside a mere million to pay for any current or future punitive damages awards.[218]
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proved so successful a means to limit Johns-Manville's liability to the victims
of its products, that other asbestos manufacturers soon followed suit.[219]
This clever maneuver was not confined to the asbestos arena. Three years after Johns-Manville filed its
bankruptcy petition, A.H. Robins, a wealthy pharmaceutical firm, also filed under Chapter 11 in order
to avoid paying thousands of lawsuits filed by those injured by the company's Dalkon Shield
product.[220]
To some extent, the courts appear to be cognizant of the connection between a bankruptcy loophole
and the undermining of the ability of punitive damages to deter conduct which may endanger the
public. In response to this concern, in United States v. Mattiace Industries, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that punitive damages awarded as a
component of a CERCLA suit, were not subject to the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code.[221] In support of its holding, the court reasoned that "government actions under CERCLA, ….
[e]ven where the United States seeks punitive damages or reimbursement of Superfund cleanup costs
in addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, thereby arguably protecting its own pecuniary interest, the

deterrence function of the relief sought will render the action one to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare. …"[222]
To the extent that the bankruptcy option is available to corporations seeking to evade responsibility for
their misconduct, it should be either completely eliminated or severely restricted. Bankruptcy allows
companies to escape paying punitive damages for their misconduct as well as full compensatory
damages to their victims. Although it is less likely that a corporation as large as Exxon would choose
to take such a drastic step as filing for bankruptcy, it remains an attractive option for smaller – though
by no means insignificant – entities, such as Johns-Manville. By eliminating the bankruptcy loophole,
the deterrent ability of punitive damages will be amplified to its intended strength. Consequently,
outrageous corporate misconduct will undoubtedly be better deterred. Tort reform, on the other hand,
will only encourage such misconduct.
III. Conclusion
Suppose that a wealthy company has just discovered that its brand-new, wildly popular product, a
substance which regenerates lush hair growth in men, also causes inoperable brain cancer in 10% of
the product's users. Suppose also that the brain cancer will not manifest itself for at least twenty years
after initial exposure to the product and that, over that twenty-year period, the company will stand to
lose billion in profit if it voluntarily recalls its product or warns the public of the dangers. The
company is also assured that, should it choose to conceal its knowledge and leave the product on the
market, its misconduct will not be discovered for at least twenty years – if then. At this juncture, the
company's course of action will depend on numerous factors including professional integrity, the size
of any applicable criminal or civil penalty, and, most saliently, the availability of unfettered punitive
damages. In a world where the punitive damages remedy has been reduced or eliminated, there would
be nothing to deter the company from allowing its product to remain in the marketplace because it
could no longer be adequately punished for any outrageous misconduct. Instead, the company would
only be liable for compensatory damages, which would likely be diminished due to the long-latency
period associated with the product. During the interim (which would be decades, at least), while the
company waits for the public to learn that its product is dangerous, hundreds of thousands of additional
consumers will be indifferently exposed to the deadly substance.
Although the full negative impact of tort "reform" on public health and the environment is
incalculable, common sense tells us that it will be significant. Punitive damages are uniquely able to
expose outrageous misconduct, punish the transgressors, compensate the victims, and deter others from
engaging in similar misconduct. When a citizen's ability to seek punitive damages is restricted or
eliminated, corporations may freely engage in intentional harmful practices for the sake of profit
margins. Therefore, citizens who wish to protect public health and the environment must not support
tort "reform." Instead, they should lobby their representatives for bankruptcy reform – not the type that
Republican lawmakers have in mind, but a real reform that improves the health and safety of our
nation, has no hidden agenda, and no hidden costs.
Particularly for larger entities, such as the Exxons of the world, only the threat of punitive damages are
capable of deterring misconduct because these corporations tend to view smaller compensatory awards
or penalties as costs of doing business. The horror of this situation is compounded by the fact that these
larger entities are capable of even more destruction than their smaller counterparts. As evidenced by

their intense effort to evade payment of the billion in punitive damages awarded in In Re Exxon, and
their extensive involvement in the tort "reform" movement, punitive damages do frighten Exxon. If
that is the case, then punitive damages must be protected and reinforced because fear is what deters
and deterrence is what will best protect us from outrageous misconduct.
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